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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
rule in the corporate field? If so, need for ratification would be dis-
pensed with; third parties could safely deal with delegates in the first
instance; and delay, the thorn in the side of modern business, could
be minimized.
RALPH H. DELFORGE
Constitutional Law -Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures-The defendant was suspected of unlawfully receiving and
concealing narcotics. He was apprehended by local and federal officers
who did not have a warrant for his arrest or a search warrant. At the
time of the arrest the defendant swallowed two capsules of heroin in
order that the heroin would not be found in his possession. He was
then forced to submit to a "stomach pump treatment" so that the
officers could obtain the heroin from his stomach. A federal officer took
part in the entire proceeding. The defendant was then indicted for
knowingly and unlawfully receiving and concealing two grains of
heroin. Held: Forcing a person to submit to a stomach pump treatment
is an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1
Any evidence obtained by such a search is inadmissible. United States
v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. California 1949).
The question raised by this decision is: to what extent will the
courts protect an individual against compulsion of physical evidence
both of and from the body? The answer to this question will depend
upon what right an individual has to such protection. The principal
case bases this right on a liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Since the Fourth Amendment is a prohibition against only those
searches and seizures that are unreasonable, the protection of the indi-
vidual hinges upon what is meant by "unreasonable". The courts say
that the question of unreasonableness is relative and each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances.2 The search may be un-
reasonable if it is out of proportion to the end sought. 3 The term un-
reasonable cannot, therefore, be precisely defined. However, the general
trend in the United States Supreme Court is to extend or broaden the
power of federal authorities to search for and seize goods without a
search warrant or, stating this trend in other words, the Supreme Court
to say that the power to fill up the details ... is not legislative power." (italics
ours).
1 U.S. Const. Amend. IV provides: "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or, affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2 United States v. Costner, 153 F. (2d) 23, 26 (C.C.A. 6th 1946).
3 Zimmermann v. Wilson, 105 F. (2d) 583, 585 (C.C.A. 3rd 1939).
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has a tendency to construe the Fourth Amendment in a limited or nar-
row sense.4 As a result of this trend it is readily seen that protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures is only granted in the more
extreme cases.
In the federal courts the accused is protected under the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure once the court de-
cides that the search is unreasonable and that the Federal Government
participated in the search or ratified it. This result follows since the fed-
eral courts still adhere to the Federal Exclusion Rule which was origi-
nated in the case of Boyd v. United States5 and was further developed
in Weeks v. United States.6 The rule is that evidence obtained through
a violation of the Federal Constitution is inadmissible if such evidence
is obtained by or for" the Federal Government. However, the rule in
the Boyd and Weeks cases does not apply if the evidence was unlaw-
fully obtained by a private person or a state authority for their own use
and then subsequently given to the Federal Government.9 Thirty states
have rejected the rule of the Weeks case.'0 These states hold that il-
legally obtained evidence is admissible in court. In a stomach pump
case the thirty states might agree with the principal case that the search
4 In regard to the power to search without a search warrant as incident to law-
ful arrest, the officer originally only had the authority to search the person
of the party arrested in order to discover and seize the fruits or evidence
of the crime. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed.
652 (1914). This right was then extended to include the power to search the
premises, other than a home, that are under the control of the party at the
place of arrest. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145
(1925). The Court then extended this privilege to the power to search a
movable vehicle upon probable cause on the theory that such a vehicle could
easily be moved from the jurisdiction where the search warrant would be
sought. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543
(1925). The broadest extension of this power to search without a warrant
was granted in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed.
1399 (1947). There the court said it is permissible to search the home of the
party arrested as incident to lawful arrest if such arrest is made in the home
of the party so arrested. Finally, the rule of the Harris case was extended to
include the place of business of the party if he is arrested there. United States
v. Rabinowitz, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 407 (1950). The Rabinowitz case also
represents another rather extreme view in this matter. The Court there held
that the relevant test under the Fourth Amendment is not whether it is rea-
sonable to secure a search warrant, but whether the search itself is reason-
able. Thus the practicability of first obtaining a search warrant is no longer
material in these unreasonable search and seizure cases.
5 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
6 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
7 ibid at 398.
8 Ward v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 189 (C.C.A. 5th 1938).
9 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921).
10 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1362 (1949). see Table I in
appendix on the present position of forty-seven states in regard to the Weeks
-doctrine.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
was unreasonable, but such a finding would not preclude those states
from introducing the heroin as evidence.
In the case of Wolf v. Colorado" an attempt was made to secure
the protection of the Fourth and Fifth1 2 Amendments as against state
action on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 13
Amendment forbids the admission of evidence that is obtained in vio-
lation of the Constitution. In that case the Supreme Court ruled that,
although the exclusion of such evidence may be an effective way of de-
terring unreasonable searches, the Court could not find that states that
admit illegally obtained evidence violate due process. It has also been
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not a part of the
right to a fair trial that is protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4
Attempts have been previously made under the Fifth Amendment 5
to seek protection against stomach pump treatment and similar acts of
obtaining evidence by physical compulsion. The majority view holds
that this provision of the Fifth Amendment is a protection against oral
or written testimonial compulsion only, rather than against all evidence,
testimonial or physical.' 6 In line with this view, the majority rule is
that forcing the defendant to exhibit or use his body as evidence is not
a violation of the self-incrimination privilege since this is not testimony
about the body, but actual use of the body itself. Therefore, measuring
the defendant, photographing him, using his clothes for identification
purposes, requiring a medical examination, blood tests, urinalysis tests
and forcing the defendant to submit to the taking of his fingerprints are
accepted by the courts as valid and proper acts of the authorities. 7
In recent cases similar to the principal case, different courts have
found various reasons for holding that the search involved was valid
or excusable. In the case of Ash v. State's the defendant swallowed two
stolen rings to avoid being caught with them. The officers forced the
defendant to take an enema. This caused the defendant to pass the
rings against his will. The Texas court held the act of swallowing the
rings was a felony committed in the presence of the officers. There-
fore it was permissible to force the defendant to give up the rings. In
11 See note 10, supra.
12 Insofar as pertinent, U.S. Const. Amend. V provides: "No person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
13 Insofar as pertinent, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1 provides: ". . . nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ... "
14 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903 (1947).
15 See note 12, supra.
'6 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910).
17 See Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8, sec. 2265 (1940).
18 139 Tex. Crim. App. 420, 141 S.W. (2d) 341 (1940).
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the case of People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan1g the defendant, when
apprehended, swallowed a package of marihuana. He was given the
stomach pump treatment. The California court held that illegally ob-
tained evidence is admissible. Furthermore, such evidence was not a
violation of the self-incrimination immunity since that privilege only
protects an individual from testimonial compulsion. Finally in the case
of In Re Guzzardi2 morphine was removed from the stomach of the
defendant by means of the stomach pump treatment. The morphine
was used to convict the defendant. A federal court held that the search
was unreasonable, but that the defendant had waived his constitutional
privilege by giving his written consent to the treatment. And since the
federal officer did not participate in the proceedings, the evidence was
admissible.
In summation the writer feels that the only adequate protection the
accused will receive against forcible submission to stomach pump treat-
ments is under the Fourth Amendment in the federal courts and also
in the courts of the fourteen states that adopt the rule of he Weeks
case. The protection granted in these jurisdictions seems more com-
plete and certainly more adequate than any protection granted in these
cases under the Fifth Amendment in any jurisdiction. The writer fur-
ther feels that an adverse decision in the principal case or the result ob-
tained in Ash v. State2 1 is one step closer to the justification of the use
of a truth serum. This in turn would revert the present judicial system,
in a scientific manner, to the very evils that led to the creation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, namely the rack and governmental
(royal) tyranny.
ROBERT F. BUSSMANN
19 74 Calif. App. (2d) 279, 168 P. (2d) 443 (1946).
20 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Texas 1949).
21 See note 18, supra.
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